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In more  recent  times,  institutions  have  become  subject  to
economic  analysis  to  a growing  extent.  Three  different
approaches  can  roughly  be  distinguished.  First,  institutions  are
analyzed  as  such  with  respect  to  their  economic  rationality,
mainly  from  a microeconomic  point  of  view  emphasizing the  role  of
transaction  costs.  This  in essence  is the  approach  of  the  New
Institutional  Economics  (Furubotn  and  Richter,  1984).  The  role
of  institutions  within  and  vis-a-vis  economic  development  and
growth  has,  second,  become  subject  of  interests  and  research  by
some  historians, but  especially  by  economists  and  agricultural
economists  (Ruttan, 1984).  Third,  the  political  decision  making
process  on  institutions  and  changes  thereof  within a given
institutional  framework  of  those  political  decisions  has  been  and
still  is analyzed  by  economists,  mainly  under  the  heading  of
Public Choice  Theory  (Mueller,  1976).  Although  all  three
approaches  are  based  on  the  same methodological  foundations,
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namely  economic  theory  of  its  neoclassical  nature,  it seems  to  be
obvious  that  until  now,  a fruitful  integration  of  these  three
approaches  has  not  yet  been  achieved,  despite the  fact  that
institutions  are  the  common  subject  of  research  and  despite the
fact  that  these  approaches  sometimes  are  combined  as  New
Institutional  Economics  in the  most  extensive meaning  (Furubotn
and  Richter,  p. 3).  This  assertion  seems  to  be  especially
relevant  with  respect  to  a special  area  of  institutions,  namely
ethics  and  morality  or,  more  precisely,  ethical  and  moral  rules
of  human  behavior.  As  far  as  these  rules  of  behavior  are
concerned  even  the  relations  between  economics  and  economic
theory  on  the  one  hand  and  morality  as  a base  of  moral  behavior
on  the  other  hand  are  obscured  to  a large  extend  and  so  are  the
potential  contributions  of  the  three  approaches  just mentioned  to
the  analysis  of moral  rules  according  to  their  methodologies
applied.  However, there  is no  rational  justification  to  exclude
ethics  and  moral  rules  because  such  rules  have  to  be  considered
as  a part  of  the  prevailing  institutional  settings  even  in
developed  countries.  You  may  argue  how  significant  moral  rules
in these  countries  really  are.  However,  besides  the  fact  that
significance  as  such  is not  a demarcation  line  for  economic
analysis,  one  has  to  admit  that  more  formalized  institutions  such
as  property  rights  are  based  on  ethical  principles  in one  way  or
the  other.  This,  however,  is not  the  subject  I will  deal  with.
Instead  of  this,  I intend  to  discuss  the  relationships  between
economics  and  ethics  which  seems  to  be  a rather  important  issue
especially  at  a time where  economics  and  economic  behavior  are3
called  into question  from  various  moral  points  of  view.  More
precisely,  such  a question  refers  to  the  basic  problem whether
morality  is something  which  has  to  be  justified  against  economic
reasoning  or  whether  ethics  and moral  rules  can  be  explained  and
justified  by  and  with  economics.  This  problem and  relevant
implications  of  the  answer  I  will  deduct  are  the  central  issue  of
this  paper.
However,  I  will  begin  my  reflections  with  a discussion  of
institutions  and  institutional  innovations  on  a more  general
base.  The  reason  for  such  a procedure  is rather simple:  We  have
already  defined  moral  rules  as  a part  of  institutional  frameworks
being  relevant  for  economic  behavior.  Institutions  and
especially  changes  of  prevailing  institutions  have  been  and  still
are  subject  of  theoretical  as  well  as  empirical  analyses  in this
Department  of  Agricultural  and  Applied  Economics.  Such  analyses
have  resulted  in a theory  of  induced  institutional  innovations
formulated  as  an  almost  logical  continuation  of  the  well  known
theory  of  induced  technological  innovations  by  Ruttan  and  his
scholars  (Binswanger and  Ruttan,  1978).1/  Therefore,  the  problem
to  be  discussed  with  respect  to  moral  rules  or  norms  defined  as  a
part  of  the  institutional  setting  and  therefore  being  relevant  as
such  for  economic  decisions  of  individuals,  is the  question  how
such  normal  rules  fit  into  such  a theory  of  induced  institutional
innovations.  We  therefore  have  to  analyze  this  theory  more
basically  at  the  beginning.  Such  an  analysis  will  facilitate  the
following  discussion  of  the  economic  dimensions  of  ethics  and
morality.  Some  conclusions  to  be  drawn  out  of  this  discussion4
will  end  up  in this  paper.
On  the  Theory  of  Induced  Institutional  Innovations
The  theory  of  induced  institutional  innovations  (Ruttan and
Hayami,  1984)  - or  as  I would  prefer  to  call  it:  endogenous
innovations  - has  a great  scientific  appeal  insofar  as,  first,
this  theory  demonstrates the  decisive  role  of  institutions  with
respect  to  economic  development  and  growth.  In a world  which  is
governed  by  institutions  and  which  obviously  needs  institutional
arrangements  in order  to  overcome anarchy,  economic  progress  only
can  be  achieved  if these  institutions  permit  or  even  stimulate
the  generating  of  technological  innovations  by  research  as  well
as  the  application  of  those  innovations  generated.  Due  to  the
fact  that  the  use  of  advanced  production  technologies  changes  the
prevailing  economic  conditions,  especially  factor  price  relations
and  transaction  costs,  different  factor  combinations  and
organizations  of  firms  will  occur  which  only  can  be  realized  if
either  existing  institutions  are  not  preventing  such  adjustments
or  these  institutions  will  be  adjusted  themselves  to  changed
economic  conditions.  Therefore,  it seems  very  obvious  that
economic development  only  can  be  achieved  by  appropriate
institutional  changes.  Insofar  such  a theory may  contribute  to
our  understanding  of  economic  progresses much  more  than  an
explanation  of  economic  growth  in terms  of  factor endowments  or
other  economic characteristics  of  various  nations  as  for  instance
Denison  has  mentioned  (Denison,  1967).  And,  insofar, the  theory
of  induced  institutional  innovations  is very  much  in line  with
the  interpretation  of  long  run  economic  development  by  some5
historians  such  as  North  and  Thomas  (1973).
The  outstanding  appeal  of  Ruttan's  theory  is founded,  second,
by  the  fact  that  this  theory tries  to  explain  the  economic
rationale  of  institutional  innovations  by  recurring  to  changes  in
demand  for  such  innovations  on  the  one  hand  and  to  changes  in
supply  of  innovations  on  the other  hand.  Whereas  changes  in
demand  are  the  outcome  of  altered  economic  conditions  as
described  above,  changes  in supply  of  institutional  innovations
is the  result  of  scientific  progress  in the  field  of  social
sciences.  According  to  Ruttan,  "advances  in social  science
knowledge  act  to  shift  the  supply  of  institutional  change  to  the
right".  And:  "Knowledge  in economics  and  in other  social
sciences  as  well  as  in related  professions  such  as  law,  business,
and  social  services  themselves  are  derived  primarily  from  a
demand  for  institutional  changes"  (Ruttan,  1984,  p. 550  resp.
552).  According  to  such  an  analogy  of  building and  rebuilding  of
institutions  to  markets  of  goods  and  services,  institutional
changes  almost  automatically  will  result  if changes  in demand  and
supply  are  occuring.
However,  such  an  analogy  seems  to  have  at  least  one
fundamental  and  far  reaching  weakness.  Whereas  changes  in supply
or  demand  in markets  are  reflected  in changes  of  relative  prices
stimulating  respective  adjustments  of  demand  and  supply,  no  such
a mechanism  is to  be  found  in the  "market"  of  institutions.
Changes  of  instutions  are  subject  to  non-market  decisions,  i.e.
political  decisions.2/  Even  if one  admits  as  Ruttan  does  that
"it seems  more apparent  today  than  a decade  ago  that  in6
non-market  environments  or  in environments  where  prices  are
severely  distorted,  the  shadow  prices  that  reflect  the  real  terms
of  trade  among  factors  and  products  (or  the  gap  between  shadow
and  market  prices)  convey  information  to  economic and  political
entrepreneurs  that  leads  to  shifts  in the  demand  for
institutional  innovation  and  performance"  (Ruttan,  1984,  p. 550),
- such  a statement  seems  rather  insufficant  as  an  explanation  of
changes  of  institutions.  The  reason  for  this  is that  changes  in
demand  for  and  supply  of  institutional  changes  - the  latter
interpreted  as  the  results  of  social  science  research  - can  only
explain  actual  institutional  innovations  if the  political
decision  making  process  on  those  innovations  is incorporated  in
such  a theory  of  institutional  changes.  Insofar  the  decision
making  process  seems  to  be  the  missing  link  which  has  to  describe
and  explain,  why  and  how  changes  in demand  as  well  as  supply  are
really  transposed  in corresponding  changes  of  institutions.
By  excluding  the  rather  unrealistic  concept  of  a well
informed  and  benevolant  dictator  as  well  as  the  model  of  the
radical  libertarians,  relying  only  on  voluntary  and  private
contracts  between  individuals  and  therefore  omitting  all
institutional  arrangements  based  on  collective  decisions
(Nienhaus,  1985,  pp.  185-193),  we  have  simply  to  consider  the
fact  that  non-market  decisions  are  subject  to  political  decisions
within  the  given  institutional  framework  being  relevant  for these
political  decisions.  Such  political  decisions  have  to  be
legitimized  by these  institutions  which,  as  is well  known,  differ
to  a great  extent  between  various  societies.  By  the  way,  we  have7
to  add  that  these  institutional  settings  for  the  political
decision  making  process  themselves  are  subject  to  changes.  We
have  to  add  furthermore  that  even markets  as  an  institution  being
relevant  for  transactions  of  goods  and  services  of  course  are  the
outcome  of  political  decisions.  Markets  can  be  and  have  been
changed  into  "non-markets",  for  instance  as  far  as  centralized
and  planning  economies  in socialistic  countries  are  concerned.3/
Now  let  me  come  to  some  conclusions  which  have  to  be  drawn  out  of
those more  general  statements:
1.  In order  to  become  an  empirically more  powerful  theory,  the
theory  of  institutional  changes  has  to  incorporate  relevant
hypotheses  concerning  the  decision making  process on
institutions.  In other  words,  the  process  of  legitimization
of  institutional  changes  demanded  and  applied  has  to  be
considered  as  well.  To  rely  only  on  some  historical  examples
of  more  or  less  successful  institutional  innovations  must  be
seen  as  insufficient  insofar  as  one  has  to  assume  that  the
process  of  economic  development  almost  automatically is
linked  to  permanent  changes  in demand  for  institutional
innovations.  Even  if one  admits  that  the  supply  of
institutional  innovations  is linked  to  discontinous  advances
in social  science  research,  the  reali-zation  of  such
innovations  by  political  decisions  is not  only  a matter  of
demand  and  supply.  Several  other  factors  are  responsible
whether  and  to  what  degree  innovations  demanded  as  well  as
supplied  by  social  sciences  are  finally  realized.  This  in
essence  is the  message  of  the  theory  of  public  choice which8
focuses  on  the  mechanics  of  non-market  decisions.
2.  Public  choice  theory,  as  well  as  a systematic analysis  of  the
history  of  institutional  changes,  may  demonstrate  that  these
changes  are  far  away  from  following  a one-way-street  as  the
theory  of  induced  innovations  does  assume.  History  shows
clearly  that  nations  do  rise  as  well  as  decline
economically.  If one  assumes  that,  as  stated  earlier,
economic  development  and  growth  depend  to  a great  extent  on
the  capability  of  nations  to  adjust  the  prevailing
institutions  adequately  to  the  conditions  and  requirements  of
economic  growth,  then  it follows  that  economic  decline  may
have  its  cause  either in the  resistence  of  the  political
system  towards  institutional  changes  or  in inadequate
decisions.  Let  me  mention  only  a few  examples  of  inadequate
institutional  reforms;  namely  first  the  collectivization  of
agriculture  in the  Soviet  Union  in 1929  and  the  stereotyped
adoption  of  this  model  of  agrarian  reforms  by  most  other
socialistic countries  after  World  War  II despite  the  negative
4/ experiences  of  the  collectivization  in the  Soviet Union.4'
Obviously  there  was  a strong  demand  for  land  reforms,
especially  in the  East-European  countries,  but  this  demand
has  had  several  sou-rces,  economic  as  well  as  political  ones.
There  has  been  a "supply"  of  land  reforms  by  social
scientists  as  the  long  discussion  on  the  appropriate  strategy
for  industrialization  of  the  Soviet  Union  before  Stalin's
decision  in favor  of  a radical  collectivization  of
agriculture  in 1929  may  demonstrate.  This  decision  of  course9
was  mainly  dictated  by  political  motives, whereas  the
economic  implications  have  been  only  of  second  order.  These
political  motives  did,  of  course,  play  a similar  role  as  far
as  the  collectivization  in the  other  socialistic  countries  is
concerned.  Therefore,  it seems  to  be  justified  to  conclude
that  collectivization  of  agriculture  in these  countries  has
much  to  do  with  the  fact  that  these  countries  achieved
relatively  slow  rates  of  economic growth.
3.  The  example of  collectivization  of  agriculture may  also
reveal  important  aspects  of  the  political  dimension  of
institutional  changes.  First,  whether  and  to  what  degree
such  changes  being  demanded  as  well  as  supplied theoretically
are  legitimized  by  the  political  decision  making  process
depends  to  a large degree  on  the  political  system  of  the
country  in mind,  i.e.,  the  design  of  institutions  in which
the  demand  for  as  well  as  supply  of  changes  are  transformed
into  relevant  political  decisions.  Next  and  in a narrow
connection  with  the  prevailing  political  systems,  it has  to
be  recognized  that  in most  cases  there  is not  only  a demand
for  institutional  changes  but  there  is also  a "demand"  for
resistance  to  such  changes.  The  reason  for  this  is to  be
seen  in the  simple  fact  that  institutional  changes  are
demanded  by  those  which  will  benefit  and  those  will  resist
which  are  expected  to  loose  economically  or  politically.
Insofar  the  decisions  on  institutional  changes  is not  only  a
decision  on  economic  growth  to  be  achieved but  also  a
decision  on  the  distribution  of  income  between  various10
groups,  beside  the  fact  that  these  decisions  are  subject  to
the  prevailing  order  of  political  decision  making.5/ Third,
with  respect  to  the  supply  of  institutional  innovations  by
social  science  research,  it has  to  be  seen  that  rather  seldom
social  scientist  fully  agree  on  appropriate  policy measures.
The  present  controversies  on  adequate  economic  and
agricultural  policies  among  scientists  are  cases  in point.
Such  controversies  very  often  are  due  to  diverging  views  not
only  with  respect  to  the  efficiency  of  various  policy
measures  but,  more  basically,  with  respect  to  a diverging
assessment  of  fair  or  acceptable  impacts  on  income
distribution.  Again,  we  come  to  the  conclusion  that
institutional  changes  are  subject  to  political  decisions
which  by  no  way  are  straight-lined  towards  economic progress.
4.  One  further  and  important  conclusion  may  also  be  drawn  out  of
our  reasoning.  It seems  quite  clear  that  an  efficient
adaptation  of  institutions to  changing  demand  and  supply
conditions  will  be  achieved  in those  areas  of  the  prevailing
institutional  framework  which  are  not  the  subject  of  direct
political  decisions,  because  they  can  be  achieved  by
voluntary contracts  between  individuals.  Whether  firms  or
farms  are  combining  various  economic  activities  horizontally
or  vertically  in order  to  increase  their  profits,  whether
they  prefer  to  act  as  independent  firms  or  prefer  other
organizational  types  of  coordinating their  activities  is
first  a matter  of  the  particular transaction  costs  involved
(Williamson,  1975)  and  second  a matter  of  the  specific  design11
of  prevailing  property  rights  (Furubotn  and  Pejovich,  1972).
If the  design  of  property  rights  - or more  generally  the
prevailing  institutional  framework  - provides  many  degrees  of
freedom  for  individuals  from which  to  choose,  the  most
appropriate type  of  organization  of  firms  or  farms,  without
being  forced  to  generate  political  decisions  in order to
restructure  inefficient  property  rights,  then  of  course an
economically  efficient  resource  allocation  over  time  has  to
be  expected  ceteris  paribus.6/  Therefore the  proportion  of
institutions  being  subject  to  private  contracts  between
individuals,  these  institutions  which  only  can  be  changed  by
political  decisions,  seem to  be  of  great  importance with
respect  to  economic  growth.  Insofar  the  poor  performance  of
socialistic  economies  can  be  explained  to  a great  extent  by
the  fact  that  in these  economies  there  is almost  no  freedom
of  individual  firms  to  choose  among  alternative  institutional
arrangements  which  fit  best  to  prevailing  economic
conditions.  And  insofar the  theory  of  induced  institutional
innovations  might  be  more  relevant  for  those  institutional
changes which  may  be  achieved  within  a given  legal  framework
and  outside  political  decisions which  are  necessary  if this
legal  framework  has  to  be  changed  in order  to  obtain  adequate
institutional  adjustments.  Again,  however,  it must  be
stressed  that  the  legal  framework  enabling  individuals to
select  economically  efficient  institutional  settings  is
themselves  subject  to  political  decisions.  Therefore,  a more
general  theory  of  institutional  innovations  has  to  be12
incorporated  in the  political  decision  making  process,  at
least  as  far  as  such  a theory  claims  to  be  capable  to  explain
and  predict  institutional  changes  beyond  those  changes  within
the  prevailing  legal  framework  of  institutions.
Ethical  Norms  and  Institutions
Until  now we  have  considered  ethics,  especially  ethical  rules
or  norms  as  the  realization  of  ethical  principles  being  relevant
and  decisive  for  human  behavior only  as  a more  or  less  important
part  of  the  prevailing  institutional  framework  without  being  very
specific.  Ethics  as  a "part"  of  the  institutional  framework  can
basically defined  in two  different  ways.  First,  it has  to  be
assumed  that  moral  commitments,  such  as  fairness  and  loyality
etc.,  are  reflected  in economic  as  well  as  political  decisions  of
individuals  and  collective  units  beside  of  ideological,  religious
or  pure  economic commitments.  Insofar  moral  commitments  are
reflected  in the  result  of  these  decisions  and  decisions  on
institutional  arrangements.  The  question  which  arises  in this
respect  refers  to  the  problem  of  the  foundations  of  economic
policy  decisions,  a question  which  is analyzed  and  better  known
under  the  heading  of  the  normative  aspect  of  economics  (see
especially  Albert,  1985).  We  will  however  not  deal  with  this
aspect  of  ethics  as  well  as  economics.  Second,  moral
commitments  such  as  fairness,  truthfulness,  loyality,  honesty,
reliability,  etc.,  are  however  guiding  and  channeling  human
actions  more  directly without  being  transposed  in formal
institutional  settings  in terms  of  legal  or  statutory  regulations
due  to  public  or  private  decisions.  Insofar,  such  ethical  norms13
have  to  be  seen  as  a part  of  institutional  frameworks  and  only  on
this  aspect  of  ethics  materialized in corresponding  ethical  norms
or  rules  we  will  further  rely  upon.
With  respect  to  the  latter  definition  of  ethics  resp.  moral
norms  several  questions  have  to  be  asked.  The  first  question
refers  to  the  (economic) explanation  or  rationalization of
morality  and  behavior  in corrspondence  with  moral  norms.  What,
in other  words,  is the  reason  for  human  beings  to  obey  moral
rules  although  such  an  obedience might  very  often  be  bound to
welfare  losses  because  such  rules  may  be  a hindrance  for  human
beings  to  act  as  selfish  as  economists  expect  they  would
according  to  the  utilitarian  foundation  of  economics?  This
question  has  to  be  seen  with  respect  to  the  widely  accepted
proposition  that  there  is a deeply  rooted  conflict  between  ethics
on  the  one  hand  and  economics  on  the  other,  insofar as  economic
theory  intends  to  explain  (and  predict)  economic  choices  of
individuals  on  the  base  and  only  on  the  base  of  selfishness  as
the  dominant  motive of  such  choices.  Ethical  rules,  however,  do
rely  on  quite  the  opposite assumption  of  an  altruistic  behavior
of  individuals  in favor  of  the  benefits  of  other  people  or
objectives  which  only  can  be  achieved  if individuals  neglect  or
suppress  selfishness  as  well  as  the  benefits  bound  to  such  a
behavior.
There  are  at  least  two  important  consequences  of  such  an
assumption  of  diverging  or  opposing  norms  of  "economic"  versus
moral  behavior.  First,  and  more  general,  ethics  and  ethical
rules  have  to  be  seen  as  "superior" to  economics  and  rules  of14
decisions  based  on  economic  cost-benefit-ratios  - "superior"  in a
moral  or  philosophical  sense.  In other  words,  ethics  is
"domesticating"  and  has  to  "domesticate"  economics.7/
Furthermore,  moral  rules  have  not  to  be  rationalized  or  justified
by  economic  reasoning but  by  something  else  such  as  "moral
sentiments"  as  David  Hume  and  Adam  Smith  have  assumed.8/  If,
however,  ethical  rules  could  be  rationalized  and  explained  in
pure  economic terms,  then  things  look  quite  different.  In such  a
case,  the  supposed  conflict  between  morality  and  economics  seems
to  be  irrelevant,  ethics  has  not  to  be  justified  against
economies  but  by  and  with  economics,  and  there  is no  reason  to
assume  that  ethics  has  to  domesticate economics.9/ We  will
return  to  this  problem  in the  next  paragraph.  Second  and  with
special  reference to  the  theory of  induced  institutional
innovation  discussed before:  If ethical  rules  or  norms  cannot  be
rationalized  in terms  of  economics,  then,  of  course,  this  theory
of  induced  innovations  is also  irrelevant with  respect  to  such
norms  based  on  morality,  although  we  have  defined  these  rules  as
a part  of  prevailing  institutional  settings  affecting  economic
choices.  Insofar  moral  rules  as  well  as  changes  of  such  moral
rules  cannot  be  captured  by  such  a theory.  Given  that  such  norms
do  play  a more  or  less  important  role  in guiding  and  affecting
human  behavior,  it follows  that  this  theory  misses  or  neglects  an
important  part  of  institutional  frameworks  and  changes thereof.
Therefore  the  theory  of  institutional  innovations  seems  to  be
fairly  restricted  as  far  as  its  explanatory  power is concerned.
There  are  still  other  questions which  have  to  be  raised  with15
respect  to  ethics  in relation  to  economics  beside  those  problems
already  mentioned.  For  instance, the  question  has  to  be  asked,
how  and  why  ethical  norms  are  affecting  individual  decisions.  We
will  see  that  this  question only  can  be  answered  on  the  base  of
an  economic  interpretation  of  moral  rules  already  mentioned.
Therefore  we  will  return  to  this  problem  later.  Next,  the
question  concerning  the  substance  of  ethical  norms  could  be
discussed.  Finally,  the  problem of  the  process  of  legitimization
of  such  norms  could  also  be  analyzed.  However, both  questions
are  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.
With  respect  to  those  problems  to  be  analysed,  it seems
appropriate  to  call  the  attention  to  the  more  or  less  common
definitions  of  institutions.  Confronting  such  a definition  with
moral  rules  may  help  us  to  clarify  the  specific characteristics
of  such  rules  in accordance  resp.  in contradiction  with
institutions  which  are  usually  considered  and  analyzed  by
economists.  According  to  Rawls  (and  others)  institutions  are
defined  "as  a public  system that  specify  certain  forms  of  action
as  permissible,  others  as  forbidden,  and  provide  certain
penalities  and  defences  where  violations  occur"  (Rawls,  1971,  p.
55).  Runge  has  recently  added  that  "institutions  channel  the
behavior  of  people with  respect  to  each  other  and  their
belongings,  possessions  and  property,  providing assurance  by
setting  the  rules  of  the  games.  They  increase the  value  of  a
stream  of  benefits  associated  with  economic  activities  by
coordinating behavior and  reducing  uncertainity  in the  realm of
human  interaction"  (Runge,  1984,  p. 807).16
Being  principally  in accordance with  these  definitions  of
insitutions  as  such,  it seems  however  necessary  to  add  some
remarks  to  clarify  things  a little  bit  more  especially with
respect  to  moral  rules  as  institutions  in order  to  improve  our
understanding  of  such  rules  as  institutions.
1.  As  we  have  already  said,  ethical  principles  are materialized
in ethical  norms  and  these  norms  are  "channelizing"  human
behavior  as  long  as  those  norms  are  respected  by  human
beings.  Insofar  such  rules  fit  rather  easily  in our
definition  of  institutions  and  insofar  such  rules  or  norms
have  to  be  seen  as  a part  of  the  prevailing  institutional
order.  However,  contrary  to  "formal"  institutions  based
either  on  private  contracts  between  various  (economic)  agents
or  based  on  public  prescriptions  legitimized  by  political
decisions  and  enforced  by  (economic)  sanctions  and/or  by
jurisdiction,  ethical  norms  are  not  enforced  by  any
sanction--if you  are  not  willing  (as  a rational  man)  to
accept  sanctions  and  renumerations  somewhere  else,  as  still
Imanuel  Kant  has  done.  This  distinction  between  formal  resp.
informal  institutions  such  as  morality with  respect  to
sanctions  is a rather  important  one,  but  not  only  due  to  the
fact  that  the  so  called  erosion  of  the  Western  world  with
respect  to morality  is very  often  the  topic  of  social
philosophers  projecting  the  decline  of  Western  civilization
such  as  Oswald  Spengler.- /
2.  Besides  this  characterization  of  moral  rules,  the  fact  also
has  to  be  stressed  that  moral  rules  are  not  at  all  subject  to17
any  political  decision  contrary  to  formalized  institutional
arrangements.  Ethical  norms  cannot  be  generated  or  changed
by  political  decisions.  These  decisions,  of  course,  might  be
based  on  ethical  norms,  they  may  furthermore  transpose  these
unwritten  moral  rules  into  written  and  formalized  norms,  laws
and  provisions  and  these  political  decisions  can  finally  (try
to)  correct  or  to  abolish  moral  rules  in some  way  or  the
other.  The  Reislamization  in some  parts  of  this  world  has,
by  the  way,  been  stimulated  by  political  decisions which  have
been  considered  as  being  in opposition  to  accepted  moral
rules.  There  are  several  implications  of  these  statements
concerning  the  nature  of  moral  rules  involved.  For  instance,
such  norms  seem to  be  more  inflexible  than  formal  or
formalized  institutional  arrangements.  Insofar,  such  norms
are  less  suitable  to  a theory  of  institutional  innovations,  a
proposition  we  have  already  made  from  another  angle  of  this
problem.  Next,  it depends  to  a great  extent  on  the  specific
nature  of  prevailing  moral  norms  whether  and  to  what  degree
they  favor  or  disfavor economic  development.  This  is, in
essence,  the  message  of  Max Weber's  explanation  of  the  rise
of  capitalism  in the  Western  world  due  to  the  ethics  of
Calvinism  stimulating  economic  growth.  However,  if ethical
norms  are  opposing  to  economic  rationality,  then  economic
development  is not  only  handicapped  but  also  a social
conflict  between  prevailing  moral  norms  and  the  "demand"  for
institutional  innovations  will  occur.  Political  decisions
favoring  such  institutional  innovations  by  substituting  and18
correcting those  moral  norms  may  result  in political  unrest
and  instability, even  in political  counterrevolutions.  This
phenomenon  may  be  interpreted  as  "moral  erosion"  and  history
has  provided  us  with  many  examples  of  such  counterrevolutions
such  as  the  Reislamization  already  mentioned.  By  the  way,
formalized  institutional  arrangements  never  can  substitute
all  moral  rules  because  even  such  formalized  rules  of
behavior are  depending  to  a great  extent  on  morality  insofar
as  the  observance of  "written"  laws  by  individuals  is very
often  only  due  to  the  "morality"  not  to  violate  such
norms--even  in the  case  where  no  prosecution  (because  there
is no  police  around)  is to  be  expected.  Due  to  social  costs
involved,  it is quite  impossible  to  regulate  and  supervise
all  aspects  of  human  behavior  by  formalized  institutions  as
most  socialistic  countries  or  the  rise  of  the
underground-economy demonstrate.
3.  Such  reflections  stimulate  the  question  concerning  the
optimal  size  and  structure  of  institutional  arrangements,  the
latter  implying  the  optimal  combination  of  formalized  and
informal  rules  of  behavior.  Beside  the  answer  given  to  this
question  by  radical  libertarians,  arguing  in terms  of  a or
the minimal  state  by  assuming  that  institutional  settings
only  are  justified  and  necessary  as  long  as  they  are  based  on
voluntary contracts  between  individuals,  economists  would  of
course,  reply that  the  optimal  size  as  well  as  the  optimal
structure  of  institutions  is to  be  achieved  as  soon  as
marginal  costs  equal  marginal  revenues.  Beside the  fact  that19
we  are,  at  least  at  the  time  being,  not  able  to  measure the
costs  and  benefits  of  institutional  arrangements  as  a
whole,ll/  this  question  has  to  be  seen  as  the  most  important
problem of  the  economic  order  of  an  economy.  The  prevailing
discussion  on  regulation  versus  deregulation  in the  Western
as  well  as  in the  "Eastern"  (socialistic) world  is just  a
part  of  this  basic  problem.  Returning  to  our  specific
problem  of  ethical  norms,  these  general  questions  might  be
concentrated  on  the  problems.of social  costs  and  benefits  of
ethical  norms.  I will  return  to  this  problem in the
following  paragraph.  I touched  on  this  problem in this
context  due  to  two  reasons.  First  and  more  generally  spoken,
institutional  settings  channeling the  choices  of  people  are
bound  to  social  costs,  opportunity  costs which  are  the  .
consequence  of  the  fact  that  "channeling"  economic  choices  of
individuals  prevents  these  individuals  to  choose  those
alternatives  which  are  more  profitable,  alternatives  which,
in other  words,  are  guided  by  selfishness.  Otherwise  no
institutional  arrangements,  providing  sanctions  in the  case
of  violations  would  be  necessary.  Insofar  as  such
institutions  are  or  at  least  should  be  restricted  to  such
areas  of  human  behavior  where  decisions  of  individuals  guided
by  selfishness  are  to  be  seen  as  inefficient  with  respect  to
the  superior objectives  of  the  society--the  general  feature
of  public  goods.  The  rational  of  efficient  institutions  has
therefore  to  be  seen  in the  fact  that  these  institutions
provide  benefits  to  the  individual  members  of  the  society20
which  exceed  opportunity  costs.  Moral  rules  already  defined
as  a part  of  the  prevailing  institutional  framework  are
especially  subject  to  these  individual  positive
cost-benefit-ratios  due  to  the  specific  characteristic  of
such  norms  that  no  sanctions  are  provided  in order to  enforce
obedience  of  individuals  to  these  norms.  Insofar  the  theory
of  induced  institutional  innovations  (including moral  rules)
may  be  reinterpreted  in such  a way  that  these  institutional
frameworks  are  generated  by  market  forces  as  well  as  by
processes  of  political  decision  making  which  are  economically
(in  terms  of  welfare  gains)  preferable  to  any  other
institutional  arrangement.  Because  of  the  fact  mentioned
earlier that  moral  rules  are  not  subject  to  political
decisions,  such  an  interpretation  of  the  theory  of
institutional  innovations  seems  especially  relevant  to  such
moral  rules.
Ethics  and  Economics  or  the  Economics  of  Ethics
After  having  discussed  the  definitional  aspects  of  moral
rules  and  some  implications  thereof,  I have  to  return  to  the
basic  problem  of  such  rules  in their  relation  to  economics  and
economic  reasoning.  The  question  to  be  answered  is whether  moral
rules  can  be  explained  and  rationalized  in economic terms  or
whether  these  rules  are  basically  "uneconomic"  in a sense  that
they  are  based  on  something  else  and  superior  to  economic
behavior  guided  solely  by  selfishness.  Until  now,  we  have  come
to  the  conclusion  that  the  obedience  to  (moral)  rules  is bound  to
opportunity  costs.  Next,  we  have  said  that  contrary  to  formal21
institutions  moral  rules  cannot  be  enforced  by  any  sanction
(excluding  renumerations  somewhere  beyond).  Because as
economists  we  are  convinced  and  rely  on  selfishness  as  the
decisive motive  of  economic  and,  more  recently,  human  behavior  in
general,  we  have  either  to  retreat  to  altruism  as  the  source  and
motive  of  human  behavior  in accordance  with  moral  rules--such  a
proposition  would  of  course  have  far-reaching  implications with
respect  to  economic theory--or  we  have  to  search  for  economic
benefits  to  individuals  exceeding  opportunity  costs.  Such  an
explanation  of  moral  rules  would  solve  the  supposed  conflict
between  ethics  and  ethical  rules  on  the  one  hand  and  economics  or
selfishness  as  the  major motive  of  human  choices  on  the  other
hand.  Furthermore,  such  an  explanation  of  moral  rules would  help
economists  to  avoid  the.conflict  between  theoretical  and
empirical  analyses  based  on  selfishness  as  the  major  motive of
human  choices  and  the  contradicting  assumption  of  altruistic
behavior.
The  crucial  question  therefore  simply  refers  to  the  benefits
which  accrue  out  of  individual  decisions  corresponding with  moral
rules  avoiding  free-riding  as  well.  Several  answers  to  this
question  have  been  tried  in more  recent  times.  I will  mention
only  four,  namely:
1.  In a more  recent  article  Vanberg  has  suggested  "that  a main
interest  that  may  motivate  an  actor  to  act  morally  is his
concern  about  his  reputation."  He  proceeds  by  saying  "to
have  a reputation  of  being  a moral  person,  a man  of
principle,  may  considerably  increase  an  individual's22
productive  efficiency,  his  capability  in producing  the
ultimate  objects  of  choice"  and  "the  reputation  of  being  a
moral  person  can  be  viewed  in this  sense  as  a kind  of  human
capital,  'human'  capital  understood  as  a general  label  for
all  inalienable  sources  of  a person's  productivity"  (Vanberg,
1986,  p. 30).  Almost  in order  to  immunize  his  proposition
against  the  critique  whether  such  a reputation-oriented
behavior  may  really  survive  the  competition  of  decisions
based  solely  on  selfish  motives,  Vanberg  adds  finally  that
"one  has  to  take  into  account  that  theories  about  payoffs
from  reputational  capital  are  typically  about  the  very  long
run  and  therefore  not  as  readily testable  as  theories  about
short  run  gains  and  losses  from  usual  behavior"  (p. 29).
Although  such  an  explanation  of  behavior  in correspondence
with  moral  rules  seem  to  be  in accordance  with  economic
cost-benefit  consideration,  but  unfortunately  only  in the
"very  long  run".  Thus  the  question  arises,  how  such
decisions  may  survive  competition  by  individuals  which  in the
short  run  are  profit maximizing.  Is, therefore,  moral
behavior  restricted  only  to wealthy  people  which  are  able  to
maintain  such  competition  in the  shorter  run?  It follows
that  we  need  a hypothesis  which  may  explain  moral  behavior  in
terms  of  economics  also  in the  short  run,  although  we  may
admit  that  Vanberg's  theory may  be  relevant  in the  long  run.
2.  Almost  a similar  difficulty  arises  if morality  and  moral
rules  are  explained  and  justified  by  reflections  on  a long
run  reasonability  or  rationality  as  has  been  expressed  by23
some  modern  utilitarists  such  as  Rawls.  The  basic  idea  of
such  a rationalization  is that  we  have  to  distinguish  between
short  run  or  "daily  preferences"  on  the  one  hand  and  long  run
or  "meta-preferences"  on  the  other  hand,  as  Sen  has  called  it
(Sen,  1977)  - meta-preferences  which  are  more  deeply
reflected  and  rationalized.  Such  a distinction  is quite
similar  to  a distinction  between  less  important  choices  based
mainly  on  traditions  and  experiences  and  more  important
choices  based  on  a rational  calculus  of  costs  and  benefits.
Beside  the  fact  that  preferences  as  such  are  by  no  way
empirically testable  and  beside the  fact  that  decisions
guided  by  tradition  and  experiences  may  well  be  efficient
with  respect  to  their  relative  costs,  it has  to  be  asked
whether  and why  such  long  reasonability  of  human  decisions
might  be  in correspondance  with  moral  rules.  In other  words,
meta-preferences  may  also  directing  human  decisions  towards
objectives  to  be  achieved  by  pure  self-interests  and  insofar
as  it is not  to  be  seen,  whether  and  why  such  long  run
decisions  may  really  differ according  to  their  relevant
motives.
3.  According  to  our  reasoning  until  now,  we  have  to  find  an
economic  explanation  of  moral  conduct,  which  is relevant  for
human  behavior generally without  any  retreat  to  a most
dubious  distinction  between  long  run  and  short  run
rationality  of  decisions  and/or  to  an  even  more  questionable
because untestable  distinction  between  daily  and
meta-preferences.  In reminding  us  of  the  definition  of24
institutions,  a first  access  to  such  a general  and  economic
rationalization  of  moral  rules  can  be  found  in Runge's
statement  that  "institutions  provide  assurance"  and
"therefore  increase the  value  of  a stream  of  benefits
associated with  economic  activity  by  coordinating  behavior
and  reducing  uncertainty  in the  realm of  human  interactions."
This  notion  of  "assurance",  if understood  in its  full
significance,  gives  a first  reliable  source  of  an  economic
foundation  and  explanation  of  institutions  in general  and
moral  rules  specifically.  Assurance  of  individuals  with
respect  to  the  decisions  by  other  individuals which  all  are
mutual  interdependent,  insofar  as  the  decisions  of  one
individual  affects  the  decision of  others  and  vica  versa  and
insofar  as  the mutual  expectaions  concerning  decisions  of
other  individuals  is to  be  considered  as  a base  of  their
decisions.  Assurance  as  a pure  public  good  in the  strongest
sense" 12/ provided  by  institutional  arrangements  "channeling"
individual  choices  therefore means  stability  and  reliability
of  mutual  expectations  of  actions  and  decisions  of  human
beings.  This  definition  and  explanation  of  institutions
implies  that  these  institutional  arrangements  seems  to  be
such  a valuable  good  exceeding  all  other  benefits  of
non-observance  (opportunity costs).  Even  more,  stability  and
reliability of  decisions  guided  by  institutions  is the
precondition  of  any  rational  behavior of  human  beings  in the
view  of  the  extensive  mutual  interdependencies  of  those  human
beings.  Therefore,  it is not  surprising  that  originally  it25
has  been  Thomas  Hobbes  who  clearly  recognized  that  human  life
without  institutional  arrangements  channeling  human  actions
and  providing  mutual  security  and  stability  of  expectations
would  be  "solitary,  poor,  nasty,  frutile  and  short"  (Hobbes,
1968  [1651],  p. 186).  The  way  out  of  such  an  anarchistic  and
unpleasant  world  can  only  be  seen  in a voluntary  renunciation
of  the  fight  of  everyone  against  everybody, a renunciation
which  is only  possible- under  the  conditions  that  "all  others
are  willing to  do  the  same",  so  that  all  can  benefit  from
such  an  agreement,  a contract  or,  in other words,
institutional  arrangements.  This  formulation  of  Hobbes,  that
"others  are  willing  to  do  the  same"  reflects  exactly  the
nature  of  such  mutual  agreements  as  a collective  good  being a
precondition  for  survival  of  human  beings  and  for  an
organization  of  their  life  and  their  choices  in a rational
manner.13/  This  is furthermore  the  basic  reason,  why
institutions  such  as  morality  do  not  restrict  liberty  as
Buchanan  has  assumed  by  speaking  of  the  "limits  of  liberty"
(the  title  of  his  book)  which  might  be  the  consequence  of
institutional  arrangement  between  individuals  (Buchanan,
1982).  Quite  the  opposite  is true.  Such  arrangements  are
expanding  individual  freedom  by  offering  more  choices  to
individuals  as  would  be  possible  without  such  institutions.
However,  such  an  interpretation  is completely  in line  with
Buchanan.  The  title  of  his  book  is just  a misinterpretation
of  his  own  findings.  In this  regard,  the  fact  however  has  to
be  emphasized  that  moral  rules  especially  are  relevant  with26
respect  to  the  extension  of  individual  freedom  because,  as  we
have  seen,  they  are  respected  by  individuals  solely  on  a
voluntary  base:  No  sanctions  enforce the  obedience  of
individuals  vis-a-vis  moral  norms.
4.  Buchanan  himself  has  added  a further  economic  interpretation
of  morality  as  a capital  good  beside  being  a public  good
(Buchanan,  1982,  p. 178).  In analogy  to  the  theory of
capital  formation  by  renunication  of  consumption  in order to
increase  the  productive  capacity  by  saving  and  investing,  the
mutual  and  voluntary  restrictions  of  choices  due  to
institutional  arrangements  as  well  as  moral  rules  will  create
"a predictable  role,  security  and  stability  with  respect to
the  realm  of  individual  decisions".  The  "input"  in the  form
of  such  restrictions,  in other  words,  creates  chances  and
possibilities  of  an  enlarged  "output"  which  without  such
institutional  settings  could  not  be  achieved.  The  reason  for
this  is that  these  inputs  would  have  to  be  used  for  the
establishment  of  security  and  stability which  is now  supplied
by  such  institutional  arrangements  in a much  more  efficient
manner.  The  experience that  individuals  accept  and  respect
such  arrangements  channeling  their  behavior voluntarily  has
to  be  seen  as  the  evidence  of  the  fact  that  the  violation  of
such  moral  rules  would  be  inefficient  and  irrational.  If,
however,  such  an  "individual"  behavior  turns  out  to  be
efficient  and  rational  due  to  changing  economic  or  social
conditions  as  compared  to  choices  in accordance with
traditional  moral  rules,  the  process  of  erosion  of  such  rules27
will  be  initiated.  In this  respect,  but  only  in this
respect,  it seems  to  be  permissible  to  argue  in terms  of  the
theory  of  induced  institutional  innovations  because  changes
in moral  rules  are  contrary to  formulized  institutional
settings  not  subject  to  political  decisions.
We,  therefore,  come  to  the  conclusion that  morality  or  ethics
being  materialized in moral  rules  of  human  behavior  can  be
explained  and  rationalized  in conformity with  those  motives  which
explain  and  determine economic  choices  of  individuals  and  which
are  the  basis  of  economic theory  analysing  and  predicting  such
economic  choices.  Therefore,  no  modification  can  be  found  for
the  proposition that  there  is a conflict  between  ethics  and
economics  as  well  as  for  the  further  proposition  that  ethical
rules  are  domesticating  economic  rules  of  behavior.  Moral  rules
as  an  important  part  of  institutional  arrangements  rely  and  are
subject  to  economic factors  to  a larger  extent  than  formalized
institutions  due  to  the  fact  that  such  rules  are  not  subject  to
political  decisions.  Insofar  the  theory  of  induced  institutional
changes  may  therefore  be  an  important  contribution  toward  a
rational  explanation  of  changes  of  moral  rules,  because  it is
allowed  to  postulate  that  selfishness  as  a motive  of  behavior
might  turn  out  as  the  most  moral  manner  of  human  behavior.28
Footnotes
1/For  a discussion  of  some  aspects  of  the  theory  of  induced
technological  innovations  see  Schmitt,  1986.
2/I  am  of  course  aware  of  the  fact  that  Ruttan  has  not
completely  neglected  this  difference  between  market  and
non-market  decisions.  Several  remarks  in his  publications  refer
to  "political  entrepreneurs"  which  are  expected  to  inaugurate
institutional  innovations.  However,  it seems  almost  obvious  that
such  political  entrepreneurs  are  only  a mechanical  "substitute"
for  market  prices  on  political  "markets"  because  such  an
entrepreneur  is by  definition  restricted  to  a person  who  "only"
realise  welfare  increasing  institutional  changes.  Insofar  it
seems  not  to  be  too  unfair  to  assume  that  such  entrepreneurs  are
quite  similar  to  the  well  informed  and  benevolant  dictator  on
which  some  economists  rely  implicitely  by  asking  for  rational
policy  decisions  in a pure  economic  sense.
3/Over  a long  time  the  question  whether  collectivizatism of
agriculture  has  to  be  evaluated economically  as  a success  or  as  a
disaster has  been  answered  very  controversial  by  Western
economists.  However,  since  the  publication  of  Barsow,  a Soviet
economist,  showing  that  during  the  thirties  there  was  a
net-transfer  of  resources  to  agriculture  instead  of  agriculture
to  the  rest  of  the  economy, most  Western  economists  agree
basically  with  such  an  evaluation.
4/According to  our  understanding,  it seems  to  be  appropriate
to  define  "markets"  in (centrally)  planned  economies  as29
"non-markets"  as  long  as  on  those  "markets"  the  exchange  of  goods
is not  directed  by  market  prices  reflecting  supply  and  demand
conditions  but  by  administered  prices  fixed  politically.
5/Welfare economists  are  used  to  recure  in those  cases  to  the
principle  of  compensation  formulated  by  Kaldor and  Hicks,
according  to  which  policy  measures  are  to  be  favored  as  long  as
the  benefits  to  be  achieved  are  at  least  sufficiant  to  compensate
welfare  losses  of  other  individuals.  However,  Rawls  (1971,  p.
48),  has  questioned  this  principle  as  well  as  the  foundations  of
welfare  economics  on  individualistic  utilitarianism  by  asking
what  motives  other  than  unselfishness  may  induce  an  individual  to
agree  to  welfare  gains  of  other  individuals  given  that  he  himself
does  not  benefit  in one  way  or  the  other.
6/It  is quite  obvious  that  the  political  decisions  on  a
proper  balance  between  "private"  and  public  institutional
arrangements  as  well  as  the  specific design  of  property  rights  is
the  crucial  question  of  an  economic  order.  This  at  least  is the
message of  the  German  "Ordnungspolitik"  (Schmidtchen,  1984).
7/The  expression  of  "domestication"  of  economics  by  ethics
has  been  introduced,  as  far  as  I can  see,  by  Homann  (Homann,
1986).
8/It  has  to  be  reminded  that  Smith  published  his  "Theory  of
Moral  Sentiments"  seventeen  years  (1759)  before  his  "Inquiry  into
the  Nature  and  Causes  of  Wealth  of  Nations"(1776).
9/For a more  detailed description  and  analysis  of  this
proposition  of  "domestication"  of  economics  by  ethics  and  the
very  diverging  philosophical  foundations  see  Homann  (Homann,30
1986).
10/There  can  be  of  course  offered quite  different
explanations  of  this  phenomenon  of  "moral  erosion."  In a modern,
highly  complicated world  traditional  moral  norms  simply  may  be
inadequate  to  institutional  frameworks  required.  Obviously,  such
a provision  seems  to  support  quite  a different  issue,  namely  the
verdict  that  such  a modern  world  becomes  more  "immoral"  to  a
growing  degree.  However,  this  is problem  of  value-judgement  to
which  one  might  agree  or  disagree.
1 /Again,  the  implications  of  the  theory  of  induced
technological  innovations  mentioned  earlier  with  regard  to
institutional  innovations  being  required  in order  to  provide
optimal  research  resources  (Ruttan,  1982,  pp.  252-261)  are
directed  towards  this  issue,  although  being  restricted  to  a
specific  area  of  institutions.
12/Buchanan  has  stressed  the  fact  that  morality  as  a pure
public  good  (such  as  not  to  lie)  provides  no  benefits  to  the
person  in mind,  contrary  to  normal  public  goods which  provide  to
those  who  produce  such  a public  good  with  (marginal)  benefits
thereof  (Buchanan,  1984,  p. 154).
13/Homann  who  has  elaborated  this  proposition  more  detailed
demonstrates the  significance  of  institutions  based  on  mutual
agreement  by  explaining  that  when  Friday  happened  to  meet
Robinson  Crusoe  for  the  first  time,  both  had  first  to  make  a
contract  concerning  rights  and  duties  of  each  of  them  before they
could  start  their  "economy"  (Homann,  1986,  p. 17).  The
alternative  to  such  a contract,  of  course,  only  could  be  the31
fight  for  survival  of  Friday  or  Crusoe.
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